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In “Expectant Fathers, Abortion, and Embryos,” Dara 
Purvis considers the interests of “expectational fathers,” 
as she calls them, in the related contexts of abortion 
and the disposition of pre-embryos in assisted repro-
ductive technologies (ART).1 Her thought-provoking 
essay contributes to a subject — men and reproductive 
decision-making — that is too little studied. I embrace 
her emphasis on respect for both men’s equal role in 
parenting and women’s right to decide whether to 
terminate or continue pregnancy. In this Comment, 
I examine her central concern that abortion discourse 
promotes harmful gender stereotypes by minimizing 
expectational fathers’ interests. I suggest that Purvis’s 
own analytic focus on intent, properly applied and 
extended, actually ameliorates her concern and points 
instead to a more direct, unapologetic acknowledge-
ment of men’s (and women’s) desires to avoid parent-
hood in particular circumstances and at particular 
times in their lives. 
For most individuals, avoidance of parenthood is 
fully consistent with loving and shared parenthood 
of existing or future children; most men and women 
desire parenthood, but not as a result of every act of 
sexual intercourse. Policies that empower men and 
women to avoid unintended pregnancy are the sen-
sible, win-win, front-line approach to addressing dis-
putes over abortion between expectational fathers and 
women.
Intent and Stereotypes
Purvis’s principal concern centers on the related con-
cepts of intent and gender stereotypes. She generally 
supports a more robust role for intent in resolving 
ART disputes2 and worries that adding abortion to the 
analysis may undermine that position: “[I]f some of 
the rhetoric debating abortion rights minimizes the 
expectational parental interest of men, does that rhet-
oric work at cross-purposes to…application of intent-
based rules in other contexts?”3 Similarly, Purvis pos-
its that abortion discourse unfairly portrays men as 
uninterested in childbearing, which in turn perpetu-
ates gender stereotypes about women. She cites in 
particular abortion opponents’ contention that men 
should have the right to avoid parental responsibil-
ity because women have the right to decide whether 
to continue the pregnancy: “By turning from narra-
tives of men saddened by abortion, who had hoped 
to become fathers, and focusing on unwilling fathers 
whose parental investment was limited to sending 
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checks, abortion critics reinforce the…perception of 
men as uninvested in children….”4
One relatively minor point regarding Purvis’s asser-
tion that abortion opponents bear responsibility for a 
harmful minimization of expectational fathers’ inter-
ests: I suspect that advocates who oppose child sup-
port obligations when women continue pregnancies 
against men’s wishes are largely distinct from abor-
tion opponents who would compel all women to con-
tinue pregnancies. There may be some overlap in the 
groups, but the arguments clearly are distinct. Roe v. 
Wade5 actually has been cited to support the argu-
ment that men’s relative lack of control of parenthood 
should relieve men of financial liability. Conversely, 
many who oppose abortion on the view that life begins 
at conception would recognize that allowing men to 
avoid child support would be counterproductive to 
their anti-abortion goals.
More fundamentally, I question Purvis’s central 
assumption that prevailing abortion discourse inap-
propriately minimizes the interests of expectational 
fathers, either to the detriment of the proper role of 
intent or the advancement of stereotypes. First, as to 
intent: an accurate portrayal of men’s lack of interest 
in parenting in the context of abortion decisions need 
not adversely affect the role intent should play in ART 
disputes for the simple reason that intent plays a fun-
damentally different role in the two contexts. When a 
man and a woman decide to employ ART, it is with the 
intent and for the purpose of having a child. Parent-
hood is the desired outcome. Disputes that arise about 
pre-embryo disposition typically result from changed 
circumstances. In sharp contrast, the vast major-
ity of abortions follow from a pregnancy that neither 
party intended; relatively few result from changed 
circumstances.6 
In fact, use of the phrase “expectational fathers” in 
the context of abortion, although a clear improvement 
over “father” alone, is far from ideal because typically 
neither party will have had an expectation of par-
enthood at the time of sexual intercourse. As Purvis 
discusses, however, there is no succinct analogue to 
“pregnant woman” to describe a man who would be 
the genetic father of a child who would be born to a 
woman if she decides to continue a pregnancy and 
successfully carries to term (fifteen to twenty percent 
of known pregnancies end in miscarriage). This full 
description is quite cumbersome, which reflects the 
complexity of the potential relationship. 
Second, regarding stereotypes: Pur-
vis certainly is correct that governmen-
tal actors and ordinary citizens alike 
should be vigilant against the pernicious, 
often unconscious influences of gender 
stereotypes on issues of pregnancy and 
childrearing. Judges, for example, some-
times confuse biological difference and 
social construct, including by conflating 
childbearing and childrearing.7 However, 
far from promoting harmful stereotypes, 
acknowledging that in most instances 
neither men nor women want a child to result from 
a particular act of sexual intercourse is vital to effec-
tive public policy. A more complete understanding of 
the realities of pregnancy, childbearing, and abortion 
points to policies that address — indeed, preempt — 
abortion disputes by reducing unintended pregnancy. 
Non-Procreative Sex and Intentional 
Parenthood
A desire to engage in sexual intercourse without risk-
ing parenthood is not a wholesale rejection of parent-
hood, by men or women. It is, quite simply, a sentiment 
shared at some point by almost all people who have 
sexual intercourse with opposite sex partners. Those 
same individuals also typically desire parenthood — 
not as a potential result of every heterosexual encoun-
ter, but at a time and with a partner of their choosing. 
Virtually all American women who have sex with men 
use contraception at some point in their lives.8 Eighty-
five percent of women and seventy-six percent of men 
will have a child by age forty.9 An estimated three in 
ten women will have an abortion in their long repro-
ductive lifetimes, but those same women bear chil-
dren and are mothers.10 Contrary to stereotypes, most 
women who have abortions are mothers: Sixty-one 
percent have at least one child, and thirty-four percent 
have two or more children.11 In one study, nearly four 
in ten women cited among the reasons for having an 
abortion that they had completed their childbearing, 
and almost one-third said that they were not ready to 
have a child.12
More fundamentally, I question Purvis’s 
central assumption that prevailing abortion 
discourse inappropriately minimizes the 
interests of expectational fathers, either to 
the detriment of the proper role of intent or 
the advancement of stereotypes.
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The unintended pregnancy rate in the United 
States is extraordinarily high at half of all pregnancies, 
amounting to more than three million a year; about 
forty percent of women decide to terminate and sixty 
percent decide to continue an unintended pregnancy.13 
Where the decision is contrary to men’s wishes, men 
suffer a real and consequential loss of procreative con-
trol. In the cases where abortion results, a man may 
suffer emotional distress from the loss of a desired 
child or the belief that abortion is the moral equivalent 
of killing a person. When a woman chooses to con-
tinue an unintended pregnancy, the course of a man’s 
life can be greatly altered by unplanned parenthood, 
particularly if the woman is not his chosen life part-
ner. Although the responsible and legally mandated 
course is to pay child support and be a loving father, 
we should not deny the complexity and costs of this 
real-world situation. 
The Supreme Court on Men and Abortion
The U.S. Supreme Court captured much of this when 
it first addressed the issue of government-mandated 
husband consent to abortion in 1976. A husband has 
a “deep and proper concern and interest…in his wife’s 
pregnancy,” but “when the wife and husband disagree 
on this decision, the view of only one…can prevail.” 
The Court held that the woman must prevail because 
“it is the woman who physically bears the child and 
who is the more directly and immediately affected by 
the pregnancy.”14 In its second and most recent deci-
sion on the issue, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the 
Supreme Court in 1992 helped dispel some impor-
tant stereotypes about the nature of such disputes.15 
Casey is best known for its five-four partial reaffirma-
tion of Roe v. Wade, but the outcome was mixed: the 
Court upheld some challenged provisions in a Penn-
sylvania law, but held unconstitutional a requirement 
that a woman notify her husband before obtaining an 
abortion. 
As the Court explained, the vast majority of women 
(about ninety-five percent) voluntarily involve their 
husbands in abortion decisions. Given these volun-
tary consultations and the incidence of pregnancy 
outside of marriage, the forced notification require-
ment touched only about one percent of expecta-
tional fathers.16 The impact on those women, however, 
often would have been devastating. The Casey Court 
explained, “In well-functioning marriages, spouses 
discuss important intimate decisions such as whether 
to bear a child. But there are millions of women in this 
country who are the victims of regular physical and 
psychological abuse at the hands of their husbands.”17 
Battering, which can include marital rape, can escalate 
with news of a pregnancy and also may extend to the 
couple’s children. “[T]he primary reason women do 
not notify their husbands is that the husband and wife 
are experiencing marital difficulties, often accompa-
nied by incidents of violence.”18 
Attempts to restrict abortion have escalated in 
recent years, but given Casey’s strong holding against 
mandated husband notification, restrictions have 
taken other forms, usually aimed at shutting down 
providers of abortion services.19 Before Casey, how-
ever, the anti-abortion movement sought to create a 
test case to overrule Roe through the dissemination of 
a “Fathers’ Rights Litigation Kit.”20 The sample pro-
ceedings in the “kit” sparked lawsuits by men seeking 
to block women’s abortions, until the Supreme Court 
made clear it would not take such a case.21 I served as 
co-counsel representing those women, who suffered 
harassment, privacy intrusions, and delays until courts 
vindicated their rights; those cases, too, involved dys-
functional, sometimes abusive relationships. Again, 
the men who have sought to enlist the force of govern-
ment to compel childbirth — or to avoid child support 
payments — are not representative of the vast major-
ity of men, who work out difficult decisions and dis-
agreements in the context of personal relationships. 
Conclusion
This extension of Purvis’s focus on intent points to the 
vital role government plays in empowering women 
and men to avoid unintended pregnancy. The rate of 
unintended pregnancy in the United States is sub-
stantially higher than in other developed nations,22 
As the four Justices dissenting in Hobby Lobby noted, however, an IUD can 
cost up to a month’s salary for an employee earning minimum wage and 
struggling to provide for a family. Our nation accrues enormous benefits 
— including the avoidance of abortion disputes between women and 
expectational fathers — by assisting women and men in their efforts to time 
the birth of children for when they are best able to bear and care for them. 
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with rates highest among economically disadvantaged 
women.23 A typical American woman wishing to have 
only two children must spend three decades avoiding 
the ten or more unintended pregnancies that would 
result absent effective contraception.24 The Affordable 
Care Act as implemented by the Obama Administra-
tion took a vital step toward filling unmet need by 
including contraception among the health care pro-
vided at no additional cost under covered insurance 
plans. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s 2014 
Hobby Lobby decision allowing certain employers to 
act upon religious beliefs to deprive their employees 
of this valuable benefit,25 most health plans will make 
available effective contraceptive methods that other-
wise might not have been affordable. For example, the 
hormonal intrauterine device (IUD) is forty-five times 
more effective than oral contraceptives and ninety 
times more effective than condoms, based on typical 
use.26 As the four Justices dissenting in Hobby Lobby 
noted, however, an IUD can cost up to a month’s sal-
ary for an employee earning minimum wage and 
struggling to provide for a family.27 Our nation accrues 
enormous benefits — including the avoidance of abor-
tion disputes between women and expectational 
fathers — by assisting women and men in their efforts 
to time the birth of children for when they are best 
able to bear and care for them. 
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